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S. N. Verdun-Jones*

Cook, Oliphant, and Yntema:
The Scientific Wing of
American Legal Realism
(Part II)

The Intellectual Tasks Performed by the Jurisprudence of Cook,
Oliphant, and Yntema
(i) The Clarificationof Goals; (ii) The Invention and Evaluation of
Policy Alternatives.
Only as men have learned to pay sincere and persistent regard to
matter, to the conditions upon which depends negatively and
positively the success of all endeavor, have they shown sincere
and fruitful respect for ends and purposes. To profess to have an
aim and then neglect the means of its execution is self-delusion of
the most dangerous sort.'
Following the lead of John Dewey, Cook, Oliphant, and Yntema
pointedly eschewed discussion of ultimate values in terms of their
intrinsic "goodness". Their own course of action was to press for
the application of scientific method - or Dewey's "method of
intelligence" - to the field of ethics. The clear message imparted
by their approach was the compelling need for the proponents of
particular values to consider the means available for the
achievement of their ideals; such consideration, it was argued,
would both heighten commitment to goals which were proved to be
capable of attainment within a given social context and lead to the
rejection of goals which would involve unacceptable social costs in
the process of realization. The method to be employed in this
intellectual operation was that of modern science; as Cook pointed
out.
It is the thesis of the present writer - a thesis developed most
fully in the writings of John Dewey - that an application of
scientific methods of inquiry to the field of 'values' (ethics and
*M.A. (Camb.), LL.M., J.S.D. (Yale); Chairman, Department of Criminology,
Simon Fraser University. Part I of this article appeared in Volume 5, No. I of the
Dalhousie Law Journal (January, 1979). The article is based on a chapter of a
J.S.D. dissertation recently submitted to Yale Law School. The author wishes to
express his thanks to Professors Reisman and McDougal of Yale Law School, for
their critical comments on this manuscript.
1. J. Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948 ed.) at
72-73
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politics, including law) will make our choices of 'ends'
"more
2
intelligent, better grounded, less subject to caprice".
One of the major consequences of maintaining such an approach
was that the tasks of goal clarification and policy invention and
evaluation fuse imperceptibly into a single intellectual operation; it
is therefore proposed to discuss the two tasks within this context of
unity.
Perhaps more than any other legal realist, Walter Wheeler Cook
was profoundly influenced by John Dewey's pragmatic philosophy;
Oliphant and Yntema, for their part, also owed a significant debt to
Dewey but the impact of his work upon their jurisprudence was
somewhat less marked. In any event, it is necessary to consider the
rudiments of Dewey's thinking if the three scholars' approach to
problems of value is to be fully comprehended. 3
The distinctive feature of Dewey's philosophy is the stubborn
insistence that science can furnish the solution to questions of value.
In his view, the identical principles of inquiry are applicable to the
moral as to the physical dimension of existence. The essence of
Dewey's thesis is succinctly presented by Professor John E. Smith:
Value and evaluation for Dewey enter whenever alternative ways
of behavior arise; alternatives mean choice and choice involves
us at once in distinguishing the better from the worse of
proceeding. Dewey hoped, by the projection of worthy goals
rooted in nature and human nature, to show that the whole
problem of value consists in discovering the best means and
materials for realizing the goals we prize .

. .

. Dewey's doctrine

of the intimate connection between ends and means was designed
to overcome the opposition between the two and to show that
ends themselves are somehow subject to the same method
of
4
intelligence required for deciding on means and materials.
2. See, Cook's contribution in Kocourek, ed., My Philosophy of Law (Boston:
Boston Law Book Co., 1941) at 59
3. See, A. Brecht, Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth Century

PoliticalThought (New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1959) at 266 ff.; Dewey in
Kocourek, ed., id. at 73-85; Dewey, Theory of Valuation (Int. Encyc. Unified
Science, Vol. II, No. 4, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1939) Passim; C. W. Mills,
Sociology and Pragmatism(New York: Galaxy Books, Oxford Univ. Press, 1964)
at 279-463; J. W. Murphy, John Dewey - A Philosophy of Law for Democracy
(1960), 14 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 291; E. Patterson, John Dewey and the Law;
Theories of Legal Reasoning and Evaluation (1950), 36 A.B.A.J. 619; J. E. Smith,
The Spirit of American Philosophy (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963) at ch.
IV; J. E. Smith, Themes in American Philosophy: Purpose, Experience, and
Community (New York: Harper & Row, 1970) at ch. 1; M. White, Social Thought
in America (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957 ed.) at ch. XIII
4. Smith, The SpiritofAmerican Philosophy, id. at 138-139
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Dewey's point of departure is the drawing of a sharp distinction
between value-statements based upon mere desire or interest and
value-statements based upon genuine "appraisal". In his view,
valuation is worthy of note only when it is based on a consideration
of both the consequence of and the conditions necessary for the
attainment of the values expressed. The value-propositions with
which Dewey was concerned were therefore directed towards the
definition and description of certain things as "good, fit or proper"
in the context of the relationship pertaining between means and ends
or means and consequences. Such value-propositions are generalizations because they form "rules for the proper use of materials"
and they may be based upon empirical propositions derived from
acceptable scientific procedures; in turn, these value-propositions
may themselves be submitted to empirical testing by comparing the
results actually achieved with those intended.
Dewey went on to argue that it is only within the context of
particular problems that valuation has any utility; 5 when life is
running smoothly there is no need for the projection of goals
because action flows in the channels of acquired habit. It is only
when "there is something the matter" or when there is "trouble" in
a concrete situation that it is necessary to investigate the possibility
of attaining "better" results in the future and, if this is so, then it is
clear that the logic of scientific inquiry - the method of intelligence
- must be ceded a crucial place in the process of projecting the
goals relevant to the amelioration of the specific problem in
question:
... valuation takes place only when there is something the
matter; when there is some trouble to be done away with, some
need, lack, or privation to be made good, some conflict of
5. Although this account is largely based upon Dewey's Theory of Valuation,
supra, note 3, the general thrust of the argument was well known before 1939. See,

e.g., the following passage written in 1920:
Moral goods and ends exist only when something has to be done. The fact that
something has to be done proves that there are deficiencies, evils in the existent
situation. This ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of
anything else. Consequently the good of the situation has to be discovered,
projected and attained on the basis of the exact defect and trouble to be rectified
... . the primary significance of the unique and morally ultimate character of
the concrete situation is to transfer the weight and burden of morality to
intelligence. It does not destroy responsibility; it only locates it. A moral
situation is one in which judgment and choice are required antecedently to overt
action.
See,supra, note I at 169, 163
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tendencies to be resolved by means of changing existing
conditions. This fact in turn proves that there is present an
intellectual factor - a factor of inquiry - whenever there is
valuation, for the end-in-view is formed and projected as that
which, if acted upon, will supply the existing need or lack and
resolve the existing conflict. It follows from this that the
difference in different desires and their correlative ends-in-view
depends upon two things. The first is the adequacy with which
inquiry into the lacks and conflicts of the existing situation has
been carried on. The second is the adequacy of the inquiry into
the likelihood that the particular end-in-view which is set up will,
if acted upon, actually fill the existing need, satisfy the
requirements constituted by what is needed, and do away with
conflict by directing activity so as to institute a unified state of
affairs. 6
One major consequence of Dewey's line of reasoning is that
value-judgments and judgments about questions of physical fact are
neatly assimilated. For Dewey, a value-judgment is not an
expression of emotion but a statement about the potentialities or
capacities of a particular "end-in-view". In this light, therefore, a
value-judgment may be said to amount to an hypothesis because it
asserts that a particular "end-in-view" will under certain conditions
furnish the solution to a specific problem. Just as the physical
scientist does not assign objective properties to things without first
assuring himself that certain test conditions are satisfied, so the
proponent of a particular value-position can not assert that his
end-in-view is desirable unless and until he assures himself that it is
attainable under conditions which he has thoroughly investigated.
Once again, Dewey indicates the indispensability of science in the
realm of ethics. As Smith points out:
By connecting value with the meeting of conditions and science
with the discovery of conditions, Dewey hoped to show that
science is indispensable for the process of evaluation. 7
We are now in a position to appreciate the reasons why Dewey
summarily discounted the notion that there is any intrinsic utility in
projecting "ultimate" goals. According to Dewey, any postulated
goal must necessarily be appraised in terms of both its empirical
consequences and the conditions essential to its realization. Since
the conditions of modern society are in a state of constant change, it
therefore becomes clear that no goal may be regarded as being
6. Dewey, Theory of Valuation, supra, note 3 at 34-35
7. Smith, The Spirit ofAmerican Philsophy, supra, note 3 at 142-143
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'ultimate' or fixed for all time. On the contrary, our most cherished
goals are but tentative hypotheses whose utility can only be
determined in the crucible of empirical science and within the
confines of concrete problems. Furthermore, Dewey argued that
even when we actually achieve a particular end this is only "final"
in the sense that a concrete problem has been solved; the end we
have accomplished in turn becomes the means to the realization of
other ends, as well as a test of valuations previously made. It is in
this sense that Dewey schematized the process of valuation as a
"continuum of ends-means":
In all the physical sciences (using 'physical' here as a synonym
for nonhuman) it is now taken for granted that all "effects" are
also "causes", or, stated more accurately, that nothing happens
which isfinal in the sense that it is not part of an ongoing stream
of events. If this principle, with the accompanying discrediting of
belief in objects that are ends but not means, is employed in
dealing with distinctive human phenomena, it necessarily follows
that the distinction between ends and means is temporal and
relational. Every condition that has to be brought into existence in
order to serve as means is, in that connection, an object of desire
and an end-in-view, while the end actually reached is a means to
future ends as well as a test of valuations previously made. Since
the end attained is a condition of further existential occurrences,
it must be appraised as a potential obstacle and potential
resource. If the notion of some objects as ends-in-themselves
were abandoned, not merely in words but in all practical
implications, human beings would for the first time in history be
in a position to frame ends-in-view and form desires on the basis
of empirically grounded
propositions of the temporal relations of
8
events to one another.
Nevertheless, it must not be assumed that generalized ideas of
ends and values perform no function in Dewey's scheme of
valuation. In his view, abstract goals operate as "plans" or
"directive means" 9 which guide our attempts to satisfy the needs in
a concrete trouble-situation. In effect, they function as intellectual
tools which trigger a consideration of the various strategies which
may be adopted to defeat a concrete problem. As Dewey puts it in
Reconstruction in Philosophy,
Health, wealth, industry, temperance, amiability. courtesy,
learning, esthetic capacity, initiative, courage, patience, enterprise, thoroughness and a multitude of other generalized ends are
8. Dewey, Theory of Valuation, supra, note 3 at 43

9. /d. at 44, 53
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acknowledged as goods. But the value of this systematization is
intellectual or analytic. Classifications suggest possible traits to
be on the look-out for in studying a particular case; they suggest
methods of action to be tried in removing the inferred causes of
ill. They are tools of insight; their value is in promoting an
individualized response in the individual situation. 10
A typical example of Dewey's approach is his treatment of the
concept of "health". A doctor has to evaluate alternative strategies
of treatment and their foreseeable results upon a particular patient.
He formulates his strategies on the basis of what his clinical
examination reveals as the "trouble" with that patient. His
evaluation of the strategies naturally revolves around their capacity
to accomplish a state of affairs in which the "trouble" is eradicated
and the patient "restored to health". The doctor is not guided by an
abstract goal of health as an ultimate end-in-itself or as an absolute
good. In Dewey's own words, the doctor
forms his general idea of health as an end and a good (value) for
the patient on the ground of what his techniques of examination
have shown to be the troubles from which the patients suffer and
the means by which they are overcome. There is no need to deny
that a general and abstract conception of health finally develops.
But it is the outcome of a great number of definite, empirical
inquiries, not on a priori preconditioning standard for carrying on
inquiries."
The impact of Dewey's pragmatic approach upon the jurisprudential writings of Walter Wheeler Cook was singularly profound.
From a very early stage in his career, he vigorously rejected the
proposition that the process of judicial choice involves exclusive
reliance upon judgments of value. In Scientific Method and the
Law, for example, he contended that "intelligent" decision-making
requires not only the clarification of goals but also an empirical
investigation of the alternative courses of action open to the
decision-maker: 12 without any knowledge of the empirical
consequences of proposed action, the decision-maker is completely
unable to exercise his powers of choice in a manner which will
realize his postulated goals.
At the heart of Cook's approach was an emphatic rejection of the
traditionally strict dichotomy supposed to exist between judgments
10. Supra, note I at 169

11.

Dewey, Theory of Valuation, supra, note 3 at 46
12. W. W. Cook,Scientific Method and the Law (1927), 13 A.B. A.J. 303 at 308
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of value and statements of fact. Like Dewey, Cook set out to
demonstrate that the two intellectual operations are inextricably
interwoven. The vehicle for the presentation of his analysis was the
3
1931 paper - The Possibilities of Social Study as A Science.1
Although Dewey's works furnished the basic tenets of the paper,
Cook's immediate source was C. I. Lewis' Mind and the
World-Order.14 Cook contended that a statement of fact has
essentially a dual character in that it not only involves a reference to
"what now is - the immediately given" but also implies a
prediction about a "whole series of future actual or possible
experiences":
..

.

. every statement of fact or descriptive

statement is

meaningless except in so far as it tells me what I ought to do, how
I ought to conduct myself, if I wish to have or to avoid this, that,
or the other experience; i.e. produce this, that, or the other
consequence or event. If I assert, "this is a fountain pen", I am
implicitly asserting "if I wish to write a letter, one way to do so is
to conduct myself in the proper way with reference
to this round,
15
red and black thing in my hand, etc., etc."
The conclusion Cook drew from this analysis was that the judicial
decision-maker cannot place his faith in ethics alone; on the
contrary, he must also take advantage of all the fruits of empirical
social science. Within the context of problem-solving, the former
without the latter is equivalent to tilting at windmills.
Cook's final utterance on these issues appeared in the 1941
collection of essays - My Philosophy of Law and it is significant
that his contribution amounted to an unashamed reformulation of
Dewey's Theory of Valuation within the context of modern
jurisprudence. Cook re-stated Dewey's theory of the ends-means
continuum and enthusiastically embraced the philosopher's view
that the same logic of inquiry developed in connection with modem
physical science can be employed in the construction of a theory of
values. Of particular significance for jurisprudential purposes is
Cook's endorsement of Dewey's approach towards "ultimate"
goals:
13. In Essays on Research in the Social Sciences (New York: Brookings

Institution, 1931) at 27 ff.
14. C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order; Outline of a Theory of Knowledge

(New York: Dover Publications, 1956 ed.)
15. Cook, "The Possibilities of Social Study as a Science" in Essays on Research
in the Social Sciences (New York: Brookings Institution, 1931) at 37-38
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It needs only slight observation to see that most of us mouth
the same 'ultimate ends', 'justice', 'honor', 'happiness',
'goodness' etc., etc. What we tend to ignore is that if we connect
these ends "with behavior, behavior with problems, problems
with social and historical contexts", we shall see that what is
called 'the ultimate end' is really advanced as a "method of
dealing with certain objective needs and lacks in an existing
situation". (Sidney Hook, "John Dewey", p. 138). What needs
to be done is to examine the existing situation and so to find out
what these needs and lacks are. When this has been done, the
results of acting upon the supposed 'ultimate end'
can be related
16
to the situation which gave rise to the difficulty.
The imprint of Dewey's philosophy is equally manifest in
Herman Oliphant's discussion of questions relating to values. He
too believed that the legal scholar should not preoccupy himself
with choosing between remote social ends until an actual
problem-situation causes such an end to have practical relevance.17
In his view, the legal scholar should instead concentrate upon
determining the empirical consequences of pursuing particular ends
in such a problem-situation.
However, Oliphant diverged from his mentors in that he appeared
to relegate the role of the jurisprude to that of a mere technician
concerned with the efficient application of community values:
Fundamental questions as to ultimate social values lie outside
the field of the lawyer as such. His work, rather, is to accept such
value-judgments as have been made by other agencies whose
business is their making and to get up and operate the legal
devices or structures best devised to carry out such judgments
with the minimum of social friction and best adapted to realize
the maximum of each of the conflicting social interests involved
in such judgments. ' 8
Oliphant did not espouse the theory of the ends-means continuum
and -

unlikely Dewey and Cook -

he therefore did not conceive

of the jurisprude's role as being that of an active participant in the
postulation of goals. In fact, Oliphant's approach in this regard is
much more akin to that adopted by Roscoe Pound whose treatment
of the task of policy invention and evaluation was also given in
terms of "the minimum of social friction" and the realization of the
"maximum of each of the conflicting social interests". For Dewey
16.
17.
127
18.

Supra, note 2 at63
H. Oliphant, Facts, Opinions and Value-Judgments (1932), 10 Tex. L. Rev.
at 136
Oliphant, CurrentDiscussionsof Legal Methodology ( 1921), 7 A.B. A.J. 241
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and Cook, however, the modern jurisprude was a good deal more
than a mere "social engineer".
The approach of Hessel Yntema to the twin tasks of goal
clarification and policy invention and evaluation was conditioned by
his grim determination to divorce the scientific enterprise of
jurisprudence from the normative art of the professional lawyers and
the judiciary. His concern was to bathe the discipline of
jurisprudence with a heavy dose of "cynical acid" flowing from its
empirical side and, although he repeatedly recognized the vital
importance of ethics to modem jurisprudence, his belief that the
traditionalists had squandered their total resources upon the ethical
side of their discipline persuaded him to redress the balance by
devoting himself to empirical science:
To those who place more faith in facts than fables, it seems a
distinct advance, for which we are indebted, among others, to
Mr. Justice Holmes, that legal science is slowly being washed
"with cynical acid". The superficialities and temptations of legal
reformism are subtle and legion. It is some insurance against
them that a few seek to attain the perhaps unattainable "aloofness
involved in the pursuit of pure science [which] is the condition of
that liberality which makes men civilized". 19
It was precisely because Yntema was so determined to establish
his position as a "pure" scientist that he studiously avoided any
discussion of the two intellectual tasks. Even though he clearly
desired that the empirical studies at the Johns Hopkins Institute of
Law should yield concrete social reforms, he nevertheless
emphatically proclaimed that his task was not to plot the course of
such reforms but rather to lay the informational bedrock so vital to
the conscientious decision-maker. 20 Yntema was perfectly content
to ferret out the "facts" and to leave the process of choice to others.
In so far as Yntema had anything to say about the tasks of goal
clarification and policy invention and evaluation, it is clear that he
was considerably affected by the pervasive current of pragmatism
although, in many respects, it was a pragmatism which had been
filtered through the jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound rather than
springing directly from John Dewey himself. Perhaps the core of
19. Yntema, The RationalBasis of Legal Science (1931), 31 Colum. L. Rev. 924

at 935-936
20. An example of Yntema's determination to avoid personal choice may be
gleaned from his foreword to Analysis of Ohio Municipal Court Acts (1930) [draft

manuscript] in which he
recommendations.

specifically rejects the task of making policy
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Yntema's approach is most succintly revealed in a passage in which
Yntema retrospectively discusses the main features of legal realist
thinking; in his view, a basic premise of the realist movement was
. . . the conception of law as a means to certain ends, an applied
science. This imported, on the one hand, consideration of the
ends to be subserved by the legal order, or in other words the
policies and values that it connotes, and on the other hand,
examination of its technical efficiency and more especially its
effects21

In articulating this premise, Yntema was perhaps reflecting his own
personal concern with improving the "technical efficiency" of law
and with mapping its "human effects": 22 both such concerns were
crucial to the pragmatic philosophy of law. Again it is through
Yntema's description of another man's work that we may glimpse
his basic concept of "justice". In 1941, he wrote of E.N. Garlan's
analysis of realistic theories of justice,
... . justice is the perennial quest for improvement in law,
functioning as a symbol to represent the need of constant
criticism and constant adaptation of law to the changing society it
articulates. It expresses the eternal motive of legal reform, "the
insistence that law is the means to ends, making achievement,
realization, preservation, and constant criticism always relevant
to judgment". In sum, justice is defined less 23
by the ideals that
may be sought than by the search for better law.
There is no doubt that Yntema assented to the basic proposition
implicit in Garlan's definition of justice.
It has been necessary to concentrate upon the philosophy of
pragmatism because its basic tenets constitute the very essence of
American legal philosophy in the pre-second world war years of the
twentieth century. In our own time, it is no doubt a simple task to
reveal fundamental flaws in the approach as a comprehensive
philosophy for modern man. For example, it is clear that Dewey's
theory of the ends-means continuum does not satisfactorily dispose
of the need for decision-makers to choose between competing goals
on the basis of a non-scientific judgment. Indeed, the logic of
21. Yntema, American Legal Realism in Retrospect (1960), 14 Vand. L. Rev. 317

at 323
22. See, e.g., Bulletin Number Five of the study of Judicial Administration in
Ohio: State-wide Studies in Judicial Administration - A Report of Progress
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ., June 1931) at 2
23. Yntema, Jurisprudence on Parade (1941), 39 Mich. L. Rev. 1154 at 1169.
The work by Garlan was Legal Realism and Justice (New York: Columbia Univ.
Press, 1941)
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scientific inquiry can only defer such a choice - it cannot eliminate
it. As Arnold Brecht puts it,
If I have found out that a certain action will impair my health, but
add to my wealth, or that it will impair both, but be useful to my
child, my friend, my country, or to humanity, I have still to
choose according to which value I do consider higher, and/or
which I ought to consider higher. When a general at war is faced
with a situation in which an attack he contemplates will save the
lives of a number of his soldiers but destroy a venerable
monument like Monte Cassino in Italy, he must, after all the
consequences are clear to him, still decide which is the higher
value. Even if he knows what is more valuable to him - he may
not care for cultural values but may care deeply about his
soldiers, or he may be a fanatic lover of cultural values but
callous as to lives - the question remains whether he ought to
prefer something different from what he does prefer, and no
argument of Dewey's relieves him or his superiors of this
responsibility. When all the information science can produce
regarding the consequences of our acts is in, and let us assume
that it is actually perfect and complete, there still remain those
two different questions: What, in view of the consequences, do I
desire? and, how ought I to act irrespective of my own desires?
• . . The answer to the latter question, unless looked for in
revealed commandments of the deity or in orders given by earthly
authorities, depends on a human decision, a choice among
competing ideas. 24

This particular weakness of the pragmatic philosophy was perhaps
not very noticeable in an age where fascism had not yet cast its
shadow over Europe and where the instruments of modern
24. Brecht, Political Theory, supra, note 3 at 268-9. For a detailed criticism of
Dewey's assimilation of fact - statements and value-judgments and a vigorous
rejection of the notion that scientific statements can impose "obligations", see
White, Social Thought in America, supra, note 3 at 214 ff.

John E. Smith probes a further weakness of Dewey's pragmatism when he
argues that it is only in the most simple of social situations that the problematic
nature of the case can be ascertained on the basis of a factual analysis alone. A
linchpin of Dewey's thesis was that values only become relevant when a "problem"
becomes apparent. However, Smith points out that many crucial choices are
precipitated by conflict between such values as "personal honesty" and "worldly
success". He continues

In these cases the "problem" does not announce itself as it does when a
physical system goes out of order; instead we require a standard of excellence
by reference to which we can say that the situation is not as it ought to be. It is
curious that the closer we come to situations which would normally be regarded
as "moral" situations, the more difficult it is to see that their problematic
character can be discovered merely by scientific analysis.
The Spirit ofAmerican Philosophy, supra, note 3 at 149
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technology had not yet been put to grossly perverted uses. The
upheavals of the second world war demonstrated the inadequacy of
such a morally shallow philosophy and the criticism that
pragmatism was oriented towards "progress without a goal" began
to ring true.
In so far as the majority of American legal realists accepted
pragmatism's rejection of ultimate values, they too earned
25
themselves a torrent of virulent and unremitting criticism.
Significantly, those who survived the war years subsequently
adopted a different position. 26 Nevertheless, it would be a gross
mistake to assume that this defeat illustrates a basic irresponsibility
on the part of the realists; indeed, nothing could be further from the
truth.
Stripped of its apocalyptic rhetoric, the realist message was in
essence a plea for judicial responsibility. Holmes, Pound, and
Cardozo had convincingly demonstrated that judicial decisionmaking was a process of choice and their jurisprudential writings
had echoed pragmatism's emphasis upon the consequences of
choice as the basis for evaluation. After their onslaught, it was no
longer possible to assert that decisions were made on the basis of
logical derivation from a hierarchy of authoritative rules and
principles. Indeed, it was soon realized that the path to progress lay
in informed and purposive decision-making. Dewey himself pointed
out:
. . . the ultimate fate is the fatality of ignorance, and the ultimate
wickedness is lack of faith in the possibilities of intelligence
27
applied intuitively and constructively.
Realists, such as Cook, Yntema and Oliphant conceived it to be
their mission to translate the ideal of responsible decision-making
into concrete reality. In attempting to harness scientific method to
25. See, e.g., W. B. Kennedy, Realism, What Next (1938), 7 Fordham L. Rev.
203; W. B. Kennedy, A Review of Legal Realism (1940), 9 Fordham L. Rev. 362.
In ContemporaryJuristicTheory (Claremont Colleges, 1940) Roscoe Pound went

so far as to claim that realism leads to political absolutism.
26. See, e.g., supra, note 21 at 329

....

(realism) came to prepare the way for the more adequate humanistic legal

science that we hope may succeed. It would be improper to hold legal realism

ultimately accountable for its limitations, if only since it had no time to outgrow
its childhood.
The switch in position of realists such as Frank and Llewellyn is documented by E.
A. Purcell in American Jurisprudencebetween the wars: Legal Realism and the
crisis of Democratic Theory, (1969-70), 75 American Hist. Rev. 424 at 434-444
27. Quoted in Mills, Sociology and Pragmatism,supra, note 3 at 405
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modern jurisprudence, they smashed the intellectual barriers
between ethics and science - demonstrating how goals may be
clarified in terms of their predicted consequences and how decisions
must be made in terms of the net social consequences of proposed
alternative courses of action: these were barriers that would never be
erected again.
Unfortunately, having indicated the place that scientific thinking
may take in responsible decision-making, Cook, Oliphant, and
Yntema and other realists abdicated responsibility for the
postulation of ultimate goals; clearly, the assumption of such a
responsibility is essential to a proper performance of the two
intellectual tasks at issue. Nevertheless, it is not too difficult to
discover some of the historical factors which may have influenced
their position. For example, the realists may be forgiven for their
suspicion of abstract ideals when the Supreme Court was mouthing
nebulous generalities as a technique for justifying the obstruction of
social change. After all, that masterpiece of obfuscation - the
liberty of contract doctrine enunciated in Allgeyer v. Louisiana was
still being quoted with approval until the early thirties. 28 No doubt
the realists felt that such ultimates were merely a euphonious facade
which covered up irresponsible decision-making.
(iii) The Analysis of PastTrends in Decision
In making our observations we shall .

find it necessary to

focus our attention primarily upon what courts have done, rather
than upon the description they have given of the reasons for their
action. Whatever generalizations we reach will therefore purport
to be first of all an attempt to describe in as simple a way as
possible the concrete judicial phenomena observed, and their
'validity' will be measured by their effectiveness in accomplishing that purpose. 29
28. Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897),

165 U.S. 578. The dictum (which

was

frequently cited with approval until the court's change of heart in Nebbia v. New
York (1934), 291 U.S. 502) ran as follows:
The liberty mentioned in (the 14th) amendment means not only the right of the
citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by
incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the rights of the citizen to be
free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful
ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful
calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into
all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to
a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.
29. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1943) at 8
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It may be recalled from our analysis of the balance of emphasis
between operations and perspectives in the jurisprudence of Cook,
Oliphant, and Yntema that a central theme in their work was the
need to construct generalizations which adequately reflect the actual
behaviour of the courts. To this end, one of their major goals was to
cut themselves loose from the ambiguities of judicial language and
to develop a technique of classifying judicial decisions in terms of
their factual context and in relation to the social and economic
policies which shaped the judges' ultimate choice.
As we have seen, Cook's initial efforts to trace the flow of past
decisions were based upon the analytical jurisprudence of Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld. 30 The main thrust of Hohfeld's approach was
the need to avoid ambiguity in judicial language. Hohfeld
convincingly demonstrated that trends in decision-making became
infinitely more discernible when it is recognized that the courts
habitually employ the same legal terminology to represent
fundamentally dissimilar conceptions. 3 1 Of course, Hohfeld's
alpine analysis of judicial decisions was based solely upon eight
legalistic categories and can only be viewed as a prolegomenon to a
more systematic description of past trends. However, its place in the
development of the approach of many legal realists to the
classification of judical decisions should not be underestimated.
Cook expanded the basic Hohfeldian approach to include not only
a razor-sharp analysis of language but also a consideration of the
social, political, and economic context within which judicial
decisions are located. Significantly he applied his technique of
analysis to perhaps the most conceptualistic of all legal studies the conflict of Laws. Typical of his approach is his blistering
criticism of the Restatement for its acceptance of the notion that
there is a single conception of domicil. 32 Cook demonstrated that
the meaning given to the legal concept of domicil varies according
to the nature of the specific problem presented to the court and that
trends in decision-making cannot be understood without an
appreciation of the factual context within which the term has been
used:
30. See, e.g., The Alienability of Choses in Action (1916), 29 Harv. L. Rev. 816
and (1917), 30 Harv. L. Rev. 449; The Utility of Jurisprudencein the Solution of
Legal Problems in Lectures on Legal Topics (New York; Macmillan's Co., 1928)
31. W. N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, ed. W. W. Cook (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963 ed.)
32. Supra, note 29 at ch. VII
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..

.

. if we were to place in one group all the cases of, say,

'domicil' as giving jurisdiction to divorce, and in another those
involving some other purpose, say taxation or intestate
succession, a comparison of these groups would show that as we
reach the doubtful cases, the verbal symbol 'domicil' has not
been given precisely the same meaning: the judges have been
influenced by the particular problem before them, and in fact,
though more often not explicitly, were deciding that the person in
question was or was not domiciled in a particular place for the
purpose then under consideration.
This, it seems to me, is quite as it should be: any other result
would mean that our judges were failing to take account33 of the
social and economic problems presented for adjudication.
One of the most celebrated expositions of Cook's methodology
was his article, 'Substance' and 'Procedure' in the conflict of Laws

(1933).3 4 In this paper, Cook convincingly demonstrated how the
analyst of trends in judicial decision-making must pierce the veil of
language and classify past decisions in terms of those fact-situations
to which similar policy considerations are applicable. In relation to
the distinction between procedure and substance in the conflict of
laws, Cook disdainfully dismissed the whimsical notion that there
exists an objective line between the two categories and that the
function of a court is to find out 'on which side of the line a set of
facts falls'. Cook pointed out that the distinction between substance
and procedure is made for widely differing purposes; hence the
perceptive analyst is aware that what the courts hold 'procedural'
for one purpose may equally well be treated as 'substantive' for
another. In other words, there is a kind of "no-man's land"
between the two opposing categories and whether a court allocates a
case to one or the other depends upon its conception of the particular
social or economic policy to be furthered by making the
classification.
The consequence of this argument is that jurists and courts must
be extremely wary of employing decisions, in which a classification
has been made for one particular purpose, as precedents for cases in
which a classification must be made in relation to an entirely
different set of circumstances. Cook argued that in fact the courts
are well aware of this danger and apply his method of analysis - if
not in theory - at least in their daily practice. However, he went
33. Id. at 196-197
34. (1933), 42 Yale L. J. 333, reprinted in The Logical and Legal Bases of the
Conflict of Laws, supra, note 29 at ch. VI
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on to suggest that the maintenance of a jurisprudential theory which
states that the courts search for a pre-existing meaning of such terms
as 'substance' and 'procedure' can sometimes lead even the greatest
of judges astray:
... . But-and this is the important thing - inadequate theory
leads sooner or later to unfortunate decisions, as is shown by the
result reached by an intelligent judge like Cardozo in the case of
the hydroaeroplane. A recognition by all judges that they are not
seeking the pre-existing meaning of the words 'procedure' and
'substance' would, it is believed, lead not to a revolution in
judicial decisions but to fewer bad ones, i.e., 'bad' in the sense of
not carrying out the social
or economic policy underlying the rule
35
which is being applied.
No doubt, Cook's method is regarded by the modern critic as being
axiomatic and in no way worthy of the publication of a complete
volume of essays dedicated to its promulgation. Nevertheless, in its
own historical context, it is surely a vital starting point for modem
jurisprudence's performance of the task of trend analysis.
A curious question in the history of American legal realism is
why Walter Wheeler Cook achieved so little of substance. His
volume on the conflict of laws consists mainly of an excursion into
the realms of method and he frankly disavowed any intention of
writing a systematic survey of the area. For example, his discussion
of the concept of domicil contains a statement of intention which
reveals much:
The foregoing discussion of the theory that the word 'domicil'
has one and only one meaning for all purposes is obviously
35. Supra, note 29 at 186. This passage was added in 1942. The case referred to is
Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service (1921), 232 N.Y. 115; 133 N.E. 371. Cook's

comments on the case were as follows:
In that case an employee was struck by the propeller of a 'hydroaeroplane'
while it was moving on navigable waters. It was held that since the plane was a
vessel "while afloat upon waters capable of navigation" and so "subject to the
admiralty" jurisdiction, the State Workmen's Compensation Act did not apply.
In his opinion Cardozo, J. apparently assumes that there is a single definition of
'vessel' for all purposes of the admiralty law, and thus by a process of what
may fairly be called 'mechanical jurisprudence' reaches his conclusion. Should
we not ask, is a hydroaeroplane even when on a navigable water the kind of
structure covered by the policy of the rule laid down in Knickerbocker Ice Co.
v. Steward? Surely we do not need to conclude that because in a collision case

the hydroaeroplane on the water ought perhaps to be held to be a *vessel' within
the meaning of a marine insurance policy or to give a lien, it is therefore a vessel
in the sense that one of the 'crew' who 'navigate' it while temporarily on the
water can maintain a libel in rem? This would indeed be a 'jurisprudence of
conceptions'.
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incomplete. It is intended, like all the other parts of this book, to
be suggestive rather than exhaustive: suggestive, that is, in the
way of indicating modes of analysis likely to yield results more
accurate as descriptions of judicial behavior and at the same time
more helpful in the consideration of new problems. 36
In line with this policy, Cook dealt with substantive topics in the
conflict of laws solely on the basis of illustrating the application of
his jurisprudential method to selected lines of cases; he never
attempted a systematic analysis of the trends in decision-making in
this area.
A possible explanation for Cook's actions may be sought in the
historical context within which he was writing about the conflict of
laws. The first thirty years of the twentieth century witnessed the
zenith of the vested rights theory with its emphasis upon a
territorialist conception of law. The theory had been accepted by the
Supreme Court in 19043 7 and was later popularized by the jurist,
Joseph Beale.3 8 Cook regarded the theory with the utmost
intellectual contempt and he devoted his energies to its destruction
- a battle which he won convincingly. 3 9 As a result of Cook's
endeavors it became clear that the function of the conflict of laws is
the carrying out of local law and policy. However, in attacking the
vested rights theory and pursuing it to its death, Cook utilized the
bulk of his energies in what was essentially a destructive exercise.
As Brainard Currie comments (with special reference to Cook),
The territorialist conception of law has been directly responsible
for indefensible results and, what is perhaps worse, has therefore
driven some of our ablest scholars
to consume their energies in
40
purely defensive action against it.
Cook himself regarded his achievement as being the removal of
"rank weeds" from the "intellectual garden" and argued that such
36. Supra, note 29 at 203
37. Slater v. Mexican NationalRailway (1904), 194 U.S. 120
38. Joseph Henry Beale - A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (New York: Baker,
Voorhis and Co., 1935); A Shorter Selection of Cases on the Conflict of Laws
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Law Review Publishing Association, 1907); Conflict
of Laws: or Private International Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Law Review
Publishing Association, 1916); The Jurisdictionof Courts over Foreigners(1913),

26 Harv. L. Rev. 283
39. Currie argues that Cook destroyed the theory "as thoroughly as the intellect of
one man can ever discredit the intellectual product of another." See, Brainerd
Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press,

1963 at 6
40. id. at 180. See also, D. F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem
(1933), 47 Harv. L. Rev. 173
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weeds had to be removed before useful plants could grow and
flourish. In this sense, he suggested that the "removal of the weeds
is . . . as constructive in effect as the planting and cultivation of the
useful vegetables".41 Pursuing this horticultural metaphor even
further, Yntema suggested that Cook, instead of eliminating the
weeds, should have reduced the whole garden to ashes, from which
a phoenix might later have arisen. 42
In any event, Cook's contribution to this field of jurisprudence
was clearly methodological rather than substantive. No doubt, the
technique of trend analysis that he proposed is now taken as being
axiomatic and the question today is one of developing specific
methods of classifying decisions according to the social, economic,
and political problems which they present to the courts;
nevertheless, it was at least a new point of departure for
jusisprudential analysis.
Yntema's approach to the task of trend analysis was remarkably
similar to that maintained by Cook. Curiously enough, he also
followed in his colleague's footsteps by devoting much of his
attention to the conflict of laws. In his early article, The Hornbook
Method and the Conflict of Laws (1927), Yntema stressed that the
classification of past trends in the form of "rules" is at best a
tentative exercise and that the purpose and factual context of the
classification must be constantly borne in mind:
It should be obvious that when we have observed a recurrent
phenomenon in the decision of cases by the courts, we may
appropriately express the classification thus adopted in a rule.
But the rule will be only a mnemonic device, a useful but hollow
diagram of what has been. It will be intelligible only if we relive
again the experience of the classifier and will be safely employed
only with knowledge of its limited purpose and of the 4scientific
3
deficiencies of the decisions from which it is abstracted.
Like Cook, Yntema was not bound by the confines of judicial
language in his description of trends in decision-making and his
major concern was to identify the differing policies enshrined in the
various decision-outcomes. However, his work went far beyond the
preliminary skirmishings of Cook and he made a serious attempt to
describe trends in decision across national boundaries. Indeed,
41. Supra, note 29 at ix
42. Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law (1953), 2 J. Am.
Comp. L. 297
43. The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws (1927-28), 37 Yale L. J. 468
at 481
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during the years following the second world war, Yntema launched
a crusade to develop the study of comparative law within the United
States and his stem commitment to this goal is evidenced by his role
in the establishment of the American Journal of Comparative
44
Law.
Significantly, Yntema regarded the failure of legal realism to
undertake research on a comparative basis as one of its most serious
shortcomings. In 1961, he wrote
... . the next step in jurisprudence must be, not to abandon the
critical achievements of legal realism, but also to develop on
more constructive lines, including particularly those that realism
tended to ignore. This would necessarily involve a humanistic
conception of legal science with due attention to systematic
analysis of legal theory and to historical and comparative legal
research.45
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that Yntema's own performance
of the task of trend analysis during the realist era was not in any way
systematic. For example, his article, The Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Anglo-American Law (1933)46 did little more than
compare American case law with recent statutory innovations in
Great Britain and the discussion of the policies pursued by the
courts is - at best - extremely sketchy. In marked contrast, a
4
post-war paper such as "Automony" in Choice of Law (1952) 1
represents a systematic trend analysis of legislative and judicial
decision-making in a wide cross-section of the world's legal
systems and also relates such decisions to the underlying goals and
objectives of these systems.
Like his two colleagues, Oliphant placed considerable emphasis
upon the need for a radically different approach towards the task of
trend analysis. As we have seen, he intended that judicial decisions
must be classified in terms of what the courts have done rather than
in terms of what they have said:
Not the judge's opinions, but which way they decide cases, will
be the dominant subject-matter of any truly scientific study of
44. See, Yntema, The American Journalof Comparative Law (1952), 1 Am. J. of

Comp. L. 11
45. Supra, note 21 at 330. For Yntema's concern with the development of
Comparative Legal Studies, see, Comparative Legal Research - Some Remarks on
Looking out of the Cave (1956), 54 Mich. L. Rev. 899; Comparative Legal Studies
and the Mission of the American Law School (1957), 17 La. L. Rev. 538;
ComparativeLaw and Humanism (1958), 7 Am. J. of Comp. L. 493
46. (1935), 33 Mich. L. Rev. 1129
47. (1952), I Am. Jo. ofComp. L. 341
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law. This is the field for scholarly work worthy of best talents,
for the work to be done is not the study of vague and shifting
rationalizations but the study of such tough things as the
accumulated wisdom of men taught by immediate experiences in
contemporary
life - the battered experiences of judges among
48
brutal facts.
Oliphant illustrated his thesis by comparing two lines of old
decisions dealing with the validity of promises not to compete. In
Oliphant's view, traditional jurisprudence regarded them as being in
hopeless conflict. However, when the factual background of the
decisions was delved into it became clear that all the cases where the
promises were declared to be invalid concerned the situation where
an employee had promised his employer not to compete with him
after leaving his service. On the other hand, all the cases where the
promises were declared to be valid concerned the situation where
the vendors of a business bound themselves not to compete with the
purchasers. By examining the factual context of the decisions,
Oliphant was able to demonstrate judicial consistency in what
appeared - from the doctrinal point of view - to be a totally
unpredictable area of the law. Furthermore, Oliphant contended that
the different outcome in each line of cases was salutary in the light
49
of economic and social policy.
With the hindsight of half a century, one may well be forgiven for
regarding Oliphant's discussion of these cases with some degree of
surprise. The thesis is pitched at a markedly less sophisticated level
than that propounded by Cook or Yntema and it is difficult to
imagine that even the most formalistic of legal scholars would have
attempted to gainsay it. 50 Curiously, Oliphant suggested that the
48. Oliphant,A Return to Stare Decisis (1928), 6 Am. L. Sch. Rev. 215 at 225
49. Id. at 226
50. Writing in 1953, Patterson said in Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law
(Brooklyn: Foundation Press, 1953) at 311, 314
The technique thus exemplified is now fairly common in the writings of
American Legal Scholars, in law teaching, and, to a lesser extent, in the
reported opinions of courts . . . . The fact-decision technique of construing
precedents is, I believe, recognised and used by American courts.
Cook and Yntema did not propound their theories at such a crude level. They were
more concerned with contextual approaches to the problem of "meaning" in law.
They did not assume that courts and scholars were unaware of fact distinctions in
the classification of past decisions for use as guides to contemporary
decision-makers. On the contrary, they argued that categorization according to
factual context rather than doctrine was in fact the prevailing technique employed
by the judiciary. For Cook and Yntema, the problem was that the technique was not
openly acknowledged and decisions were clothed in opaque doctrinal garments.
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courts make the vital distinctions between differing factual
situations on a purely intuitive basis. In relation to the distinction
drawn in the cases involving promises not to compete, he said:
This distinction between these two lines of cases is not even
hinted at in any of the opinions but the court's (sic) intuition of
experience led them to follow it with amazing sureness and the
law resulting fitted life. That is a sample of the stuff capable of
scientific study. 51
Perhaps Oliphant's most significant contribution to the enhancement of techniques of trend analysis was his critical role in the field
of legal education. 52 Oliphant was a prime mover in the debates on
curricular reform at Columbia Law School during the 1920s and a
major plank in his own program was the re-arrangement of the law
curriculum so that decisions on functionally related problems could
be grouped together for teaching purposes:
. . . . if we are really to get at the fundamentals, the organisation
of the curriculum must be more in terms of the human relations
present legal
dealt with and less, as largely now, in terms of the
53
concepts of the conventionally trained legal mind.
In 1922, Oliphant pioneered a course on trade regulation at
Columbia and, in the following year, he published his Cases on
Trade Regulation5 4 - a book which gathered together decisions
from many of the basic courses at the law schools of the day and
related them to concrete problems in the everyday regulation of
business. Following his success in bursting through the traditional
legal classifications, he applied himself with gusto to the
formulation of a grand plan for the re-organization of the whole law
school curriculum. His final view appears to have been that the
syllabus should be divided, into three basic functional categories family; business; and political relations. These categories would
then be further subdivided: for example, business relations would be
Their concern was to persuade decision-makers to reveal the "true" bases of their
choices and thus render the decisions more responsible. Furthermore, they believed
that failure to remember that meaning shifts with context occasionally made the
judiciary themselves unaware of the true nature of the problems involved in a case
and the policies applicable to it. Oliphant seemed to assume that both courts and

jurisprudes were totally unaware of these considerations - a proposition which is,
with due respect, somewhat naive.
51. Supra, note 48 at 226
52. See generally, B. Currie, The Materials of Law Study (Part III) (1955), 8 J.
Legal Ed. 1
53. The Future of Legal Education (1929), 6 Am. L. Sch. Rev. 329 at 332

54. See, Currie, supra, note 52 at 3-6
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split into the categories of business units, labor relations,
marketing, financing, risk and risk-bearing while political relations
would be grouped around the three divisions of law administration,
55
criminal law plus criminology, and public law.
This ambitious project failed for many reasons but Oliphant's
contribution to the area of trade regulation has been regarded as
seminal and the manner in which he re-organized traditional case
and statutory materials in terms of economic and social problems
has exercised a considerable effect on the development of modern
techniques of trend analysis. Tragically, Oliphant may be said to
have followed in Cook's footsteps in so far as he developed a novel
technique of trend analysis but then failed to apply it in any
systematic survey of decisions. During his career at Columbia,
Oliphant was involved in the task of promulgating the goals of the
curricular re-organization movement and consequently devoted
little time to substantive work. In 1925, he published the first part of
an article on Mutuality of Obligation in Bilateral Contracts at Law,
the sequel to which appeared in 1928.56 These articles were based
"on logic, on the analysis of precedents, and on strictly
"arm-chair" evaluation of the practical considerations"; 57 they
contained no analysis of decisions in terms of social and economic
policy and, in this respect, they were a curious product to fall from
the pen of an ardent legal realist. In 1926, he published a brief paper
entitled Trade Associations and the Law5 8 and here at least 55. Supra, note 53 at 332 ff. See also Oliphant, ed., Summary of Studies in Legal
Education by the Faculty of Law of Columbia University (I928)passim.
56. (1925), 25 Colum. L. Rev. 705 and (1928), 28 Colum. L. Rev. 997. The

manner in which Oliphant almost retreats to the very mode of analysis which he
previously critized so vigorously is illustrated by his outline of the relevant issues:
1. Is there some well established "principle" in the law of contracts from
which the supposed general rule, that both parties must be bound, follows as a
matter of logical necessity?
2. Are there "'logical" arguments opposed to the supposed rule?
3. Are there cases in the books which involve and, hence, pass upon this
question, in addition to the cases already referred to and commonly thought to
be exceptions to the supposed rule? What have been the opinions of judges and
text-book writers on this question?
4. As a matter of practical convenience how does the matter stand? Is such a
rule necessary or unnecessary to avoid injustice or is the question neutral in its
practical aspects?

25 Colum. L. Rev. 707.
57. Supra, note 52 at 77n
58. (1926), 26 Colum. L. Rev. 381. For some reason, Curie ignores this article.
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Oliphant did attempt to discuss decisions in the light of policy
considerations but the analysis was based upon a minute sample of
four Supreme Court cases. 59 In 1927, Oliphant delivered his famous
presidential address to the Association of American Law Schools A Return to Stare Decisis6 ° in which he outlined his stimulusresponse theory of judicial decision-making and advocated closer
analysis of the factual context of decisions; this work, however, was
purely methodological and contained no substantive analysis. In
sum, Oliphant developed the tools for an adequate performance of
the task of trend analysis but he failed to employ them in any
substantive venture; as Brainerd Currie has remarked,
Oliphant compiled a pioneering casebook which required the
addition to the curriculum of a new course, based on a novel
grouping of materials; the novel course is now standard in almost
every law school. If he had devoted his energies to the
improvement of that book and to the construction of others,
instead of buirding fires in the camps of his colleagues, he might
have been remembered, like Langdell, as the founder of a new
era in legal education
rather than as the leader of a movement
61
which foundered.
One final comment in relation to the task of trend analysis is that
Cook, Oliphant, and Yntema all concentrated upon the decisions of
appellate tribunals when they attempted to trace the flow of judicial
decisions. As Jerome Frank pointed out in strident tones, 6 2 the
appellate arena is but a small part of the process of authoritative
decision-making and for this reason it is imperative that the analyst
of past trends in decision-making should cast his net over the whole
range of tribunals operating in any given system.

59. An example of the level of analysis is contained in the following concluding

passage:
On such ponderous social questions as marked changes in the form of the whole
industrial structure, society seldom formulates a conscious policy: it plunges
into change by revolution or slowly drifts into change when it moves at all. If
we could now plot the whole of the curve which is defined by the day to day
decisions of our courts concerning competition and only a bit of which we can
now see, we could probably predict developments infinitely more momentous
than all these thousand trade associations, which after all, are doubtless but a
passing phase of our commercial evolution.
Id. at 395
60. (1928), 6Am. L. Sch. Rev. 215
61. Supra, note 52 at 77
62. See, e.g., Frank, Modern and Ancient Legal Pragmatism - John Dewey &
Co. v. Aristotle (1950), 25 Notre Dame Lawyer 207 at 255
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(iv) The Scientific Task: The Analysis of Factors Conditioning
Decision
In law we cannot institute suits to test judicial behavior; as the
physicists make experiments to test the behavior of matter. But
each case is a record of judicial behavior. 63
Surprizingly, Cook and Yntema manifested no interest in the
construction of even the most rudimentary conceptual model of the
decision-making process. In a manner which set them distinctly
apart from their colleagues in the realist movement, they blithely
ignored both the institutional and the psychological factors which
may be said to condition judicial decision-making.
The one dimension of the decision-making process which did
concern Cook and Yntema was the question of the impact of legal
rules upon the ultimate disposition of cases. As we have seen, Cook
and Yntema confined their attention to the appellate arena and it is
within this rarefied context that their analysis of the impact of rules
upon decision-making must be considered. In their view, the
appellate case load may be said to consist mainly of 'new' cases in
which the "facts" diverge significantly from previous problemsituations dealt with by the courts. Legal rules cannot determine the
outcome of such 'new' cases because they are themselves only
tentative classifications of past judicial decisions and thus the
critical factor in shaping the final result must be the judges'
conception of the economic or social policy which ought to be
applied. The appellate court often talks of "applying" a legal rule
in such circumstances; however, in Cook's view, such a statement
is fundamentally inaccurate because what the court has really done
is to extend the class of cases subsumed under a legal rule so as to
include the particular case in hand. As Cook puts it in The Logical
and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,
The actual process involved in settling a situation of doubt - a
'new' case, if we are dealing with law - involves a comparison
of the data of the new situation with the facts of a large number of
prior situations which have been subsumed under a 'rule' or
"principle" within the terms of which it is thought the new
situation may be brought. This comparison, if carried on
intelligently, necessarily involves a consideration of the policy
involved in the prior decisions and of the effects which those
decisions have produced. If the points in which the new situation
resembles the older situations already dealt with are thought to be
63. Supra, note 48 at 229
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the qualities the existence of which were decisive in leading to
the decisions in the prior cases, the new case will be put under the
old rule or principle. In doing this, the rule or principle as it
existed has not been merely 'applied'; it has been extended to
take in the new situation .

. .

. the danger in continuing to

deceive ourselves into believing that we are merely 'applying' the
old rule or principle to 'a new case' by purely deductive
reasoning lies in the fact that as the real thought process is thus
observed, we fail to realize that our choice is really being guided
by considerations of social and economic policy or ethics, and so
fail to take into consideration
all the relevant facts of life required
64
for a wise decision.
By way of contrast, Cook and Yntema appear to have believed
that most cases which are presented at trial court level are generally
of a routine nature and are decided on the basis of "habit" rather
than reflective thought.6 5 In such cases, the trial judge recognizes
that the "facts" presented are so similar to those manifested in a
group of previous decisions that he automatically arrives at the same
final result. In such circumstances, the judge may be said to have
applied a legal rule in that he has declared a particular fact situation to be within a pre-existing class of phenomena for which a
specific outcome is deemed to be appropriate.
It is indeed curious that these two self professed devotees of
scientific method should have identified what they believed to be
the decisive factors in the appellate decision-making process
without attempting either to clarify their nature in conceptual terms
or to clothe them with any form of empirical garb. Clearly, the
individual personality of the appellate judge affects both his
perception of the facts frozen in the case-record and his
determination as to which is the appropriate economic or social
policy to apply to them; yet Cook and Yntema were content to leave
these critical factors lurking behind the blanket assertion that
"policy" determines the outcome of appellate decision-making. If
Cook and Yntema felt squeamish about pursuing the type of
subjective individual psychology which aroused the interest of
64. Supra, note 29 at 43-45
65. See, id. at 182-3 n:

....
many of the cases which present themselves to a trial judge are so much
like other cases already passed upon that they are disposed of in a more or less
routine way without much thought . . . cases of this kind do not require

reflective thinking; they are disposed of by habit. And of course by far the larger
proportion of situations to which the answer seems clear never go to court at all
unless the facts are in dispute.
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Thurman Arnold and Jerome Frank they could easily have turned
their attention to those institutional factors which condition judicial
decision-making. For example, their erstwhile Columbia colleague,
Underhill Moore, harnessed the natural science model of
jurisprudence to identify some of the environmental variables which
affect the outcome of the decision-making process. 6 6 Nevertheless,
Cook and Yntema proved to be strangely reluctant to tread any path
which might require them to apply scientific method to the analysis
of the operation of appellate courts.
Their treatment of the trial process is open to similar criticism although it must be said in fairness that this was an area which the
two scholars dealt with only tangentially. Perhaps the major flaw in
their description of the trial process as being dominated by the force
of "habit" was the failure to consider the effect of the personality of
the trial judge either upon his determination of "the facts" in a case
where they are in dispute or upon his perception of the "relevant"
facts in a case where the litigants are in substantial agreement as to
"what happened". As Jerome Frank has so vividly demonstrated,
the trial judge may well manipulate his findings of fact so as to
disguise "unusual" cases as "routine" or vice versa where he feels
that the "justice" of the case so merits such a course of action 67
and he may do this either consciously or unconsciously.
The only plausible conclusion to be drawn from the analysis
propounded by Cook and Yntema is that neither of the two scholars
was particularly concerned with the task of examining the factors
which actually condition authoritative decision-making. When they
attacked the contention that legal rules and principles control
judicial decisions they cannot be considered as having attempted to
substitute a scientifically based model of the decision-making
process. On the contrary, when they boldly identified the judges'
conception of economic and social policy as the decisive element in
the process, they were really attempting to persuade the judiciary to
bare their perspectives in a frank manner so that a critical
assessment of the policy implications might be undertaken. Exactly
how these perspectives were moulded and how environmental
66. See, e.g., Moore and Hope, An Institutional Approach to the Law of
Commercial Banking (1929), 38 Yale L.J. 703; Moore and Sussman, Legal and
Instutional Methods Applied to the Debiting of Direct Discounts (1931), 40 Yale
L.J. 381, 555, 752, 928, 1055, 1219; Moore, Sussman, and Brand, Legal and

Institutional Methods Applied to the Debiting of Direct Discounts (1931), 40 Yale
L.J. 817, 1198
67. See, Frank, Courtson Trial (Atheneum, 1969 ed.) at 168
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variables triggered particular courses of action was of little concern
to them as jurisprudes. Ironically, by terminating all inquiry into the
operation of the decision-making process with the mere mention of
the word "policy", Cook and Yntema in effect replaced one sacred
cow of jurisprudence -

the authoritative legal rule -

with their

own quasi-mystical concept of "policy": in any event, each device
operated with equal efficiency to forestall genuine examination of
judicial behavior.
At first sight, it appears that Herman Oliphant made a valiant
attempt to develop a conceptual model of the decision-making
process. Indeed, his stimulus-response analysis suggests that he was
more than willing to follow the lead of Underhill Moore in applying
the principles of behavioralistic psychology to the judicial process.
In A Return to Stare Decisis, he boldly argued that
The predictable element in it all is what courts have done in
response to the stimuli of the facts of the concrete cases before
them. Not the judges' opinions, but which way they decide cases,
will be the dominant subject-matter of any truly scientific study
of law .

. .

. The response of their intuition of experience to the

stimulus of human situations is the subject-matter having 68that
constancy and objectivity necessary for truly scientific study.
However, when Oliphant's analysis is probed a little more
deeply, it soon becomes evident that his adoption of the
stimulus-response terminology cannot be treated as a genuine
attempt to apply learning theory to the behavior of judges; indeed,
such familiar concepts as drive, cue, and reinforcement are all
conspicuously absent from Oliphant's exposition. His ingenuous
analysis focussed exclusively upon the stimulus of "the facts" of a
case; quite why he ignored all other stimuli, such as the influence of
oral and written argument, is not even explained let alone justified.
Furthermore, Oliphant appears to have contended that "the facts"
which are to be treated as the sole object of study are those facts
which happen to be included in the case record; 6 9 the naive
assumption that other background facts which are not recorded are
totally devoid of any influence upon the course of judicial
decision-making surely deprives Oliphant's analysis of any shred of
68. Supra, note 48 at 225
69. This interpretation is also made by Patterson in his Jurisprudence:Men and
Ideas of the Law, supra, note 50 at 314 n. Oliphant's approach differs markedly

from that maintained by Underhill Moore who analysed the factual background of
cases without reference to the case-records. See, Moore and Sussman, Legal and
InstitutionalMethods Applied to the Debiting of DirectDiscounts, supra, note 66
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scientific plausibility.
Similar difficulties abound when an examination is made of the
sole "response" which concerned Oliphant. In focussing upon
"what the courts have done in response to the stimuli of the facts"
Oliphant naturally ignored the response of the judicial opinion: his
reasons for dismissing this facet of judicial decision-making have
already been discussed. However, in conceptual terms it is difficult
to grasp what Oliphant meant when he said that the jurisprudes must
concentrate upon "what the courts have done"; this is a phrase
which is riddled with ambiguity. As Harold Reuschlein has pointed
out

True, in a comparatively small number of single cases, it is
doubtless possible to do a pretty good job of guessing at what the
judge believed to be the fact and therefore to successfully guess
what fact he was really passing upon. Ordinarily, however, one
cannot know what the judge really decided except in the sense
that he handed down a judgment for Jones or gave Smith a
ten-year prison term, or enjoined Dooley from interfering with
Brown because there are so many different factors in70the evidence
which unite to direct the judge's mind to a decision.
It is significant that modern quantitative analysts of the judicial
process have avoided the gross ambiguity inherent in Oliphant's
thesis and have instead operationalized the judicial "response" in
terms of individual votes for or against the values defined by
71
particular legal norms.
Curiously enough, Oliphant let the cat out of the bag when he
stated what he believed to be the decisive force which ultimately
shaped the nature of the judicial response to "the facts". In his
view, this force was the 'judges' "intuition" of what was a fair
solution to the problem at hand:
Judges are men, and men respond to human situations. When the
facts stimulating them to the action taken are studied from a
particular and a current point of view, which our present
classification prevents, we acquire a new faith in stare decisis.
From this view point we see that courts are dominantly coerced,
not by the essays of their predecessors, but by a surer thing, by an
intuition of fitness of solution to problem, and
a renewed
72
confidence in judicial government is engendered.
70. H. G. Reuschlein, Jurisprudence - Its American Prophets (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1951) at 283-84
71. See Schubert, ed., Judicial Behaviour: A Reader in Theory and Research
(Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1964) at 443-460
72. Supra, note 48 at 225-226
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It is indeed ironic that ajurisprude who so sedulously cultivated the
image of a hard-boiled pragmatic scientist should have constructed
an explanation of judicial decision-making in terms of a vacuous
concept which almost rivals the Volkgeist in its metaphysical
mystique. It is equally surprising that Oliphant should have
manifested such faith in the judicial fraternity when he had devoted
so much of his work to the criticism of judicial opinions. 7 3 In the
final analysis, Oliphant's stimulus-response approach cannot be
taken as a serious application of behavioral psychology to the
decision-making process. Despite his radical terminology, Oliphant
ultimately propounded a thesis which corresponds pretty closely to
the rather traditional approach of Karl Llewellyn's The Common
Law Tradition; indeed, the parallels between Llewellyn's "imma74
nent law" and Oliphant's "intuition of fitness" are most striking.
When it is stripped of its behavioral rhetoric, Oliphant's analysis
ultimately boils down to the fundamental realist message that
decisions must be classified according to their factual background
rather than in terms of the doctrine which justifies them.
(v) The Projectionof Future Trends in Decision
As practicing lawyers we are interested in knowing how certain
officials of society-judges, legislators, and others have
behaved in the past, in order that we5 may have a prediction of
their probable behavior in the future. 7
In so far as Cook, Oliphant, and Yntema made little attempt to
analyse the factors conditioning judicial decision-making, it is
scarcely surprising that they also failed to undertake any systematic
approach to the task of predicting future trends in decision. Like
Llewellyn, they clearly indicated that an analysis of past trends in
decision in terms of 'situation-types' can be a most valuable tool in
the prediction of judicial decisions. However, this technique was
obviously limited to those cases where there was no significantly
"new" element in the problems presented to the court. In order to
determine whether an appellate court will perceive the existence of
73. For a discussion of the ethical implications of the "intuitionist" approach in
legal realism, see, W. L. Morison, Frames of Reference for Legal Ideals (1975), 2
Dal. L. J. 3
74. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1960)
at 127. There is also a parallel to be drawn between Llewellyn's belief that an
analysis of background facts would restore faith in the "reckonability" of
decision-making and Oliphant's views in A Return to Stare Decisis, supra, note 48
75. Supra, note 29 at 29
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such a 'new' element and what its response will be in such
circumstances requires a systematic analysis of considerably more
than past trends in judical decision-making.
Modern quantitative analysts of judicial behavior have indicated
the type of approach to the predictive task which will yield more
fruitful results. 76 Glendon Schubert, for example, has demonstrated
the extent to which a knowledge of individual judge's attitudes may
lead to tolerably accurate predictions of their votes on critical issues
of policy. In outlining his psychometric model of the decisionmaking process in the United States Supreme Court, Schubert
bestows empirical hands and feet upon the policy analysis urged by
Cook and Yntema.
The processes employed for the selection of Supreme Court
justices are such that it is reasonable to assume that each justice
either comes to the Court with, or soon acquires as the result of
the kind of task with which he is charged, relatively
well-structured attitudes towards the recurrent major issues of
public policy that confront the Court for decision. On the basis of
an analysis of their content, it is possible to identify the common
issues, and the relevant attitudinal dimensions that are functions
of these issues. This content analysis provides the basis for
systematic discussion of the set of attitudinal dimensions that is
most important for a series of subsets consisting of the justices
who comprise the Court at any particular time, even if there is
considerable individual variation in the direction and intensity of
judicial attitudes, as these are measured on the relevant
dimensions over an extended period of time . . . . characteristically the effect of what are called "the facts" of the case is to
provide direction and intensity in defining the nature of the issue;
that is, the issue specifies which attitudinal dimension (or
determine where
dimensions) is (or are) relevant, while the facts
77
a particular case is located on the dimensions.
76. See, e.g., J. B. Grossman and J. Tanenhaus, eds., Frontiers of Judicial
Research (New York: John Wiley 1969); W. F. Grunbaum and A. Newhouse,
Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Decisions: Some Problems in Prediction (1965),
3 Houston L. Rev. 201; Schubert, ed., JudicialDecision-Making(New York: The

Free Press of Glencoe, 1963); Note Schubert, Predictionfrom a Psychometric
Model at 548; Schubert, supra, note 71; Schubert and Danelski, Comparative
JudicialDecision-Making: Cross Cultural Studies in PoliticalDecision-Making in
the East and West (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969). For a skeptical critique
of Schubert's methodology, see, Slayton, A Critical Comment on Scalogram
Analysis of Supreme Court of CanadaCases (1971), 21 Univ. of Toronto L.J. 391;
QuantitativeMethods and Supreme Court Cases (1972), 10 Osgoode Hall L.J. 429
77. Schubert, The JudicialMind: The Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court

Justices 1946-1963 (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1965) at 37-38
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Other quantitative analysts have attempted to operationalize the
type of fact analysis advocated by Oliphant. The first such analyst,
of course, was Underhill Moore who endeavored to identify a
correlation between the outcome of judicial decisions and the degree
to which 'the facts' of any given case deviate from commercial
practice. Modem analysts - such as Kort, Lawlor, and Ulmer have
taken advantage of the significant developments in computer
technology to evolve more sophisticated mathematical models of
prediction. 78 However, it has been argued that the type of fact
analysis which Oliphant tentatively suggested is in any event
doomed to ultimate failure because such an approach ignores the
critical impact of judicial attitudes upon the perception of "the
facts" presented to a court. For example, Schubert argues that
So far as we are aware, neither Kort nor Lawlor nor anyone else
has yet explained how or why it is possible for "facts" to
determine or control the decisions of judges - or of any other
human beings . . . .On the basis of various assertions - many
of them in conflict - about the empirical events of the trial, an
appellate court judge makes an inference about what he believes
he ought to believe to have occurred . . . .The appellate court
judge's inference will be a function, inescapably, of his own
attitude toward the value he selects as the criterion for perception
of the fact. No set of appellate judges is exposed to the same
information about any case . . . .each approaches the task of
inference with a different set of values and attitudes. It is easy to
see why appellate judges disagree about what are the "facts" in a
case, as well as about what is the "law" . ...In the Supreme
Court, facts are judicial perceptions of empirical events; and it is
the perceptions not the events themselves, that influence judicial
decisions. 79
78. See, e.g., Fred Kort - PredictingSupreme Court Decisions Mathematically:
A Quantitative Analysis of the Right to Counsel' Cases (1957), 51 Am. Pol. Sc.
Rev. 1; "Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions and Rules of Law" in Schubert,
ed., JudicialDecision-Making, supra, note 76 at 133; Simultaneous Equations and
Boolean Algebra in the Analysis of Judicial Decisions (1963), 28 Law and
Contemporary Problems 164; R. Lawlor, What Computers Can Do: Analysis and
Prediction of Judicial Decisions (1963), 49 A.B.A.J. 337; S.S. Ulmer,
Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Processes: Some Practical and Theoretical
Applications (1963), 28 Law and Contemporary Problems 164; "Mathematical
Models for Predicting Judicial Behaviour" in Bern, ed., Mathematical
Applications in PoliticalScience III (Charlottesville: Univ. of Virginia Press, 1967)
at 67; -The Discriminant Function and A Theoretical Context for its Use in
Estimating The Votes of Judges" in Grossman and Tanenhaus, eds., Frontiersof
Judicial Research, supra, note 76 at 335. See also W. F. Grunbaum, Search
Criteria as Boolean Functions (1966), 8 Journal of Jurimetrics 86; S. Nagel,
Applying Case Analysis to Case Prediction (1964), 42 Texas L. Rev. 1006
79. Supra, note 71 at 451-52
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In response to such criticism, some scholars have now developed
predictive models which incorporate both attitudinal and "fact" or
"stare decisis" considerations. 8 0 Naturally, it would be unreasonable to expect that Cook, Oliphant, and Yntema should have
developed such sophisticated models for the prediction of judicial
decisions as those employed by modem behavioral scientists;
indeed the models constructed during the course of the last two
decades have very definitely been the creatures of modem computer
technology. However, it is exceedingly strange that three scholars
who both recognized the importance of the predictive task and
advocated the development of empirical science should have failed
to explore the possibilities of even the most rudimentary systematic
analysis of judicial decision-making. Certainly, there is no
conceivable reason why they could not have undertaken a
systematic survey of past judicial decisions as the first step towards
the achievement of predictive capability. In the final analysis, one is
confronted by the very same paradox which runs right through the
work of Cook, Oliphant, and Yntema: all three devoted massive
energies to the realist campaign for an empirical science about law
but left no substantial research or serviceable techniques to
jurisprudential posterity.
80. See, e.g. W. F. Grunbaum, "Analytical and Simulation Models for
Explaining Judicial Decision-Making" in Grossman and Tanenhaus, supra, note
76 at 307.

